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A recent article called “Neurobiology, layered texts, and correlative cosmologies”1 by Steve 
Farmer, John B. Henderson and Michael Witzel (henceforth FHW) argues that correlative 
thought is not confined to one or just a few cultures. Rather, the deepest roots of correlative 
thought lie in neurobiological processes. Parallel developments in correlative cosmologies, 
it is maintained, provide a potent cross-cultural framework for premodern studies in 
general. This is a very interesting proposition which deserves close consideration. The 
present article cannot do it full justice, and will merely explore one of its aspects in relation 
to Indian culture. But before such an exploration can take place, clarification of some of the 
issues involved must be attempted. 
 What, to begin with, is correlative thought? FHW use this expression to refer to “a 
general propensity to organize natural, political/social, and cosmological data in highly 
ordered arrays or systems of correspondence” (p. 49). Correlative thought is a recognized 
feature of Chinese culture (since Marcel Granet's La pensée chinoise, 1934) but, FHW 
maintain, “similar tendencies can be identified in every traditional civilization known”. 
Indeed, “[c]orrelative structures show up world wide in premodern magical, astrological, 
and divinational systems; in the designs of villages, cities, temples, and court complexes; in 
abstract orders of gods, demons, and saints; and in many similar phenomena”. Our authors 
then continue: “The idea that reality consists of multiple ‘levels’, each mirroring all others 
in some fashion, is a diagnostic feature [10] of premodern cosmologies in general; tracing 
this idea from its primitive origins to its modern decline is one of the major challenges 
faced by specialists in premodern thought.” 
 FHW distinguish between correlative thought in general on the one hand, and ‘high-
correlative’ systems which can arise out of it on the other. High-correlative systems are 
                                                
1 This article appeared in the volume for 2000 of the Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities, which 
came out in 2002. 
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“multileveled reflecting cosmologies, nested hierarchies, abstract systems of 
correspondences, and similar developments” and grow “as byproducts of exegetical 
processes operating in layered textual traditions over extensive periods” (p. 48). Following 
FHW, we must therefore distinguish two stages, each in need of its own explanation. Here 
our authors have the following to say (p. 64): “Neurobiology highlights what might be 
termed the primitive default conditions in correlative thought. But it cannot on its own 
explain how or why high-correlative systems evolved in advanced premodern civilization.” 
It cannot, because here the layered texts which figure in the title of the article come into 
play: “Many of the most distinctive features of high-correlative systems can be modeled as 
syncretic byproducts, or ‘exegetical artifacts’, of repeated attempts to reconcile conflicts in 
heavily layered textual traditions.” 
 A further statement about the relationship, and difference, between correlative 
thought in general and ‘high-correlative’ systems with special reference to developments in 
the West can be found in the book Syncretism in the West: Pico's 900 Theses (1486) by S. 
A. Farmer (1998), one of the authors of the article under consideration (pp. 83-84):  
 
Renaissance magic ... was grounded on the principles of what since Frazer's time 
has been commonly referred to as imitative or sympathetic magic. In its nonliterate 
varieties, imitative magic in all periods in the West differed little from the primitive 
correlative magic practiced universally in preliterate societies. At its foundations lay 
loose metaphorical networks potentially linking every object in nature — expressed 
anthropomorphically, nature's “loves” and “hatreds,” “sympathies” and 
“antipathies.” ... In purely oral traditions little effort was made to transform these 
metaphorical networks into more complex formal systems ... In the literate magical 
traditions ... the situation was different. Starting in the Hellenistic era, these 
networks were progressively tightened and systematized, eventually fusing with the 
broader hierarchical cosmologies of late Greek Neo-Platonism and related 
traditions. 
[11] 
To these two stages — correlative thought and high-correlative systems — a third must be 
added, corresponding to the “modern decline” mentioned earlier, viz., “the final collapse of 
those systems in the early scientific era”. This collapse, FHW point out (p. 74), is due to 
some “exceptional nonlinear conditions”. In a note (no. 66) they add: “Given their origins 
in neurobiological processes, correlative tendencies obviously show up in different ways in 
modern traditions; we plan to discuss this issue elsewhere”. 
 The present article will skip the arguments meant to show the neurobiological 
foundations of correlative systems. The conclusion seems plausible enough, even though it 
is less clear, at least to the present author, how the arguments presented lead up to it. We 
will rather concentrate on the transition from correlative thought in general to high-
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correlative systems in India, a transition which is supposedly due to layered texts and all 
that accompanies their formation. About this transition FHW provide the following 
information (p. 51 ff.): 
 
Especially rich evidence on the early stages of high-correlative thought survives in 
early Vedic traditions, preserved in heavily layered texts from the middle third of 
the first millennium BCE that vastly outnumber extant Chinese and Greek sources 
from the same period. Correlative ideas in Vedic traditions, often (but not 
exclusively) referred to as “bandhus” (bandhu = relation, bond, connection, etc.) 
have been discussed by a long line of Indologists ... Claims have been made that all 
of Vedic philosophy depended on what Sinologists would immediately recognize as 
“correlative thought” — although Indologists do not use that phrase — emerging in 
increasingly complex and abstract forms in successive strata of tightly linked 
Bråhmaˆas, Óraˆyakas, Upani∑ads, and SËtras in Vedic traditions ... 
 ... By the middle of the first millennium BCE, at the latest, we find elaborate 
high-correlative systems emerging in Vedic traditions as exegetes struggled to 
harmonize heavily layered ritual texts passed on from earlier eras. To cite just one 
example: In later strata of the Taittir¥ya Bråhmaˆa, apparently dating from early in 
the second half of the millennium, we find elaborate lists of bandhus in which each 
Vedic god is systematically correlated with unique numbers, consorts, ritual meters, 
directions, seasons, hours of the day, priestly orders, oblations, sacrificial animals, 
and similar phenomena. ... Similar correlations are even more fully developed in 
Vedic Upani∑ads and SËtras from the last half of the millennium, which exegetically 
“worked up” ... earlier traditions in even more abstract directions.  
[12] 
A number of questions present themselves at this point. In this case it is clear what is meant 
by correlative, even high-correlative, thought, precisely because a long line of Indologists 
have discussed it (without necessarily using that expression). This however gives rise to the 
first question: Why should this kind of thought grow “as byproducts of exegetical processes 
operating in layered textual traditions over extensive periods”? Why should many of its 
most distinctive features be “syncretic byproducts, or ‘exegetical artifacts’, of repeated 
attempts to reconcile conflicts in heavily layered textual traditions”? What exactly happens 
in exegetical processes that might explain this? 
 Details about these processes are given in the following passage (FHW p. 69): 
 
One consequence of layering processes was that the texts available ... were 
increasingly loaded with contradictions; ironically, authorship of those texts was 
typically ascribed to ancient seers, sage-kings, “school” founders, mythic heroes, 
prophets, or divine forces, implying exactly the reverse — that those texts could not 
be contradictory; that every apparent conflict hid secret truths. That assumption led 
to the application of a broad spectrum of exegetical tools to unveil those truths, 
resulting in predictable correlative transformations of earlier sources. By the end of 
the fourth century BCE, developments of this sort were already well on course in 
the Middle East, Greece, India, and China; repeated use of similar exegetical 
methods in all these regions resulted in accelerated abstract developments in 
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otherwise unrelated religious, philosophical, and cosmological traditions — 
efficiently explaining many so-called axial age effects. 
 
Further2 information can be found in another article, “Commentary traditions and the 
evolution of premodern religious and philosophical systems: a cross-cultural model”, this 
one by Steve Farmer, John B. Henderson, and Peter Robinson (FHR, 2002). We learn from 
it that commentators were confronted with the task of reconciling or “syncretizing” 
traditions (FHR p. 2). They had to free authoritative traditions from internal contradictions 
or to harmonize them with foreign traditions. One way to attain this goal is the introduction 
of “scholastic distinctions”, for example levels in heaven and hell (FHR p. 3). This process 
repeated itself numerous times, since the outcome of a preceding [13] “layer” of 
commentatorial activity is the basis for the next one. Each new layer of tradition, whether 
embodied in canonical texts or later commentaries, tended to transform the products of 
earlier strata in predictable ways (FHR p. 5). We can therefore speak of the repetitive 
application to sacred and semisacred traditions of a relatively small, and largely culturally 
invariant, series of commentatorial techniques. The commentators were obliged, not only to 
syncretize opposing or foreign traditions, but also to harmonize conflicting layers of 
canonical texts (FHR p. 6). 
 The results of this multi-layered commentatorial activity could generate, among 
other things, abstract pantheons of gods, monotheistic deities, or abstract ethical or 
cosmological principles. In later traditions, our authors maintain, typical products included 
dualistic or trinitarian concepts of deity, broad systems of correspondences, multileveled 
pictures of heaven or hell, elaborate emanational systems, and other diagnostic features of 
scholastic traditions. They add: “Over many centuries, higher-level integrations of 
structures like these gave birth to elaborate multilayered correlative systems — Neo-
Platonic, Neo-Confucian, Buddhist, Hindu, Islamic, or Christian cosmologies, etc. — 
whose levels of self-similarity tended to increase whenever those traditions inbred and grew 
in complexity.” (FHR p. 6). 
 It is more or less understandable that the obligation to make sense of “syncretizing” 
traditions may have led commentators to pursue a number of exegetical strategies, such as 
identifying gods from different traditions, making place for “foreign” gods by introducing 
refined distinctions, etc. etc. It is harder to understand why this should inevitably lead to 
correlative or even high-correlative thought. What exegetical situation would be solved by 
systematically correlating “each Vedic god ... with unique numbers, consorts, ritual meters, 
                                                
2 Most of the following two paragraphs occurs verbatim in Bronkhorst, 2006. 
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directions, seasons, hours of the day, priestly orders, oblations, sacrificial animals, and 
similar phenomena”? No answer is even attempted by our authors, as far as I can see. 
 This takes us to a second question: What reason is there to believe that the high-
correlative systems which we find in Vedic literature are the result of multi-layered 
commentatorial activity trying to free the own tradition from internal contradictions or to 
harmonize them with foreign traditions? To the best of my knowledge there is none 
whatsoever. The [14] high-correlative thought present in Vedic literature is no doubt 
extremely interesting, and its parallels with similar phenomena in China and the West have 
not sufficiently been studied. But far from being the result of multi-layered commentatorial 
activity of the kind described, it creates the impression of being a more or less consciously 
cultivated characteristic of Vedic society, especially in late-Vedic times, which sought to 
distinguish itself in this way from others.3 
 The passage about India cited above continues as follows (FHW p. 53-54): 
 
Correlative systems of still greater complexity, especially rich in numerological 
associations, are found in early Buddhist and Jainist texts compiled near the close of 
the millennium. 
 By the early common era, centuries of reworkings of these layered texts had 
given birth to high-scholastic systems of extraordinary elaboration. These 
developments are beautifully illustrated in the intricate logical-mystical constructs 
of the massive seventh book of the Buddhist Abhidhamma Pi†aka ... Correlative 
systems of the same general type as those seen in post-classical Daoism in China, or 
in contemporary gnostic, Neo-Pythagorean, or Neo-Platonic traditions in the West, 
can be studied in later strata of the Mahåbhårata and Puråˆas, in countless tantric 
and maˆ∂ala sources, and in late-ancient and medieval scholastic systems 
subdivided (just as elsewhere in the Old World) into a profusion of warring 
“schools”. Fresh developments in these systems continued to appear up through the 
Mughal period, exhibiting structural features similar to those seen in contemporary 
high-syncretic systems from the European Renaissance or Ming dynasty. These 
parallel developments can be simply explained by the fact that those systems arose 
from integrations of layered traditions whose temporal depth and complexities were 
of roughly the same magnitude in each previous stage of history, stretching from the 
mid first millennium BCE until early modern times. 
 
This passage is not as clear as one might wish. It concerns post-Vedic India, but does not 
refer to any secondary literature, unlike the part dealing with the Vedic period. For this later 
period it mentions as sole example of presumably high-correlative thought a book from the 
Abhidhamma Pi†aka of Theravåda Buddhism. The reason for this is no doubt to be sought 
in the remark, made on p. 54, saying that “while bandhus [15] and upani∑ads in Indian 
                                                
3 Bronkhorst, 1999: 52-53; 2007 (esp. ch. IV.1 “Discworld meets roundworld”). Note that the idea that Vedic 
culture is syncretistic is not new; see, e.g., Parpola, 1997. 
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traditions have been discussed continuously since the nineteenth century, the importance 
assigned to correlative thought by Indologists has never approached the levels found in 
Chinese studies, hampering the comparison of cosmological developments in the two 
civilizations”. This suggests that there simply is no secondary literature about correlative 
thought (by whatever name it may be called) in post-Vedic Indian literature. The cited 
passage shows, however, that in FHW's opinion the presence of high-correlative thought in 
those later Indian sources is obvious and undeniable. More in particular, their remark to the 
extent that “[c]orrelative systems ... can be studied ... in late-ancient and medieval 
scholastic systems subdivided ... into a profusion of warring ‘schools’” suggests that what 
is commonly referred to as “Indian philosophy” exemplifies correlative thought. This is 
remarkable. The presence of “high-correlative” thought in the Veda is clear and beyond 
doubt. This literature also constitutes its pinnacle. Similar ways of thinking, especially 
about cosmic correspondences, find expression later on in certain genres of literature, 
prominently among these Tantric literature,4 but never again with the same intensity. 
 In this context it is of interest to consider an article by Michael Witzel called 
“Macrocosm, mesocosm, and microcosm: The persistent nature of ‘Hindu’ beliefs and 
symbolic forms” (1997). This article suggests continuities and analogs of some structures of 
modern Newar Hinduism with those of the Vedic period. Some of these persistences 
include the procedure found in the Bråhmaˆa texts of analyzing the universe on three levels 
and connecting these by a series of ‘identifications’ (homologies), for example, and the use 
of ‘creative etymologies’ (p. 503). All this seems to confirm that “(high-)correlative 
thought”, where present in post-Vedic India, continues a Vedic tradition. There is no 
suggestion that exegetical strategies have to be invoked to explain its presence in recent 
forms of Hinduism. 
 We will return to these issues in a while. Let us first try to get a fuller grasp of 
FHW's ideas. One of the studies on which their article is based is the book Scripture, 
Canon, and Commentary: A comparison of Confucian and Western exegesis by John B. 
Henderson (1991), one of the [16] authors of the article that engages our attention. The title 
of this book suggests that it may contain information as to how high-correlative systems 
come about. Remember FHW's statement, already quoted above: “Many of the most 
distinctive features of high-correlative systems can be modeled as syncretic byproducts, or 
‘exegetical artifacts’, of repeated attempts to reconcile conflicts in heavily layered textual 
traditions.” Scripture, Canon, and Commentary does indeed discuss a general 
commentatorial assumption, viz., that the canon is self-consistent, that internal 
                                                
4 Cf. Filliozat, 1999. 
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contradictions in it are only apparent (p. 115 ff.). But it says nothing about high-correlative 
systems that arise as byproducts. It says nothing about correlative thought, and indeed, 
neither this expression nor other ones such as “correspondences” can be found in the index. 
 More relevant material can be found in Farmer's Syncretism in the West. The 
following passage deals with the issue that concerns us (p. 74): 
 
Syncretic methods like Pico's had systematic effects that were remarkably similar no 
matter what traditions were being fused. The historical significance of these 
methods lies here, since they illuminate otherwise mysterious parallels in the 
evolution of traditions. These effects were clearer in literate than in oral traditions, 
whose fluidity permitted syntheses in flexible and impermanent ways. 
Reconciliations of literate traditions, however, required the use of formal syncretic 
methods like those planned by Pico for his Vatican debate. The systematic effects of 
these methods were cumulative and are best observed evolving in traditions over 
vast periods of time. ... 
 The most obvious result of the use of these methods was the sheer 
complexity that they introduced into systematic thought. When religious and 
philosophical exegetes could not harmonize the conflicting concepts of their 
authorities more directly, the tendency was to carve out niches for all those concepts 
somewhere in their systems. The results of this compilational mode of thought were 
much the same whether room for those concepts was created by use of a standard 
scholastic distinction, by some variation of the double-truth, or by the invention of 
cosmic correlations and hierarchical distinctions to preserve their full or partial 
truth. 
 
The last sentence of this passage is particularly interesting. It emphasizes that room for 
conflicting concepts could be created “by use of a standard scholastic distinction, by some 
variation of the double-truth, or by the invention of cosmic correlations and hierarchical 
distinctions”. It does [17] not state that each of these ways had to be used in each tradition. 
One could easily imagine a culture which, for reasons of its own, avoids one or more of 
these methods, for example the invention of cosmic correlations. That is to say, one may 
sympathize with the model presented by Farmer c.s. without feeling obliged to look for 
high-correlative thought presumably resulting from the processes included in it. India may 
well be an example that shows that high-correlative thought cannot be counted among its 
necessary consequences, and indeed that high-correlative thought can come about in other 
ways. This culture has its share of high-correlative thought, primarily (though not 
exclusively) in Vedic literature, but it is not the result of the iterated application of 
exegetical methods. It is not my intention to offer an alternative explanation for the 
presence of correlative thought in certain literary manifestations of Indian culture, but 
FHW's claim to the effect that it has a neurobiological basis, combined with the further 
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claim that certain religious currents may believe that this kind of thought provides access to 
hidden levels of reality,5 might go at least part of the way. 
 
Let us now turn to the “late-ancient and medieval scholastic systems subdivided (just as 
elsewhere in the Old World) into a profusion of warring ‘schools’” (FHW p. 54), which 
includes no doubt the different schools of Indian philosophy. Resolving contradictions was 
no doubt a prime concern of these philosophical schools. This led them to systematize their 
thought, but not to produce high-correlative systems. Correlative thought is weak or even 
totally absent in most of them. One reason may be that these systems are not the result of 
iterated exegetical processes based on ever more-inclusive canonical texts. During the 
classical period each philosophical school rather has one basic text, and the differences 
between the schools are not differences of interpretation, but differences that are at least in 
part already enshrined in the fundamental texts of each of them. 
 Correspondences as we find them in Vedic literature are absent from classical 
Brahmanical philosophy. We do occasionally find traces of the [18] identification of 
macrocosm and microcosm. An example is the Såµkhya philosophy which, still in its 
classical formulation, appears to confuse the two levels. Eli Franco (1991: 123 f.) puts it 
like this: “One of the reasons why many of us feel uneasy with the Såµkhya philosophy is 
that we are never quite sure where we stand and whether the ancient teachers were talking 
psychology or cosmology. Typical psychological and individual terms like cognition, ego, 
mind, sense organs, and even hands, feet, tongue, anus and penis, become trans-individual 
and obtain cosmological dimensions.” In the present context it is important to observe that 
this identification of macrocosm and microcosm is not only a problem for the modern 
researcher. The tradition itself, including its classical commentaries, was concerned with it, 
and made efforts to remove it.6 The philosophy of Bhart®hari contains a similar ambiguity, 
but the more recent Utpaladeva who appropriated part of his thought made sure that it was 
removed.7 
 M¥måµså is the school of Vedic hermeneutics which is the only “school of 
philosophy” that is interested in the Vedic texts that display high-correlative thought. 
Though interested in these Vedic texts, M¥måµså is not interested in high-correlative 
thought. Sentences or passages expressive of high-correlative thought are barely ever cited 
                                                
5 I assume that also FHW will agree that not all hidden levels of reality are to be explained through iterated 
exegetical processes. 
6 See on all this Bronkhorst, 1999a; 2001: §§ 5 & 8. 
7 Bronkhorst, 2001: § 6. 
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in its works,8 and the school itself does not utilize it. The other school of M¥måµså which is 
better known by the name Vedånta (or Brahma-M¥måµsa, later also Uttara-M¥måµså) 
concentrates its attention on some Upani∑adic sentences.9 Some of these — such as tat tvam 
asi “that you are” — might conceivably be interpreted in terms of correlative thought,10 but 
the Vedåntic interpreters do not do so. 
 Particularly interesting in connection with the theory of Farmer c.s. is the 
philosophy of the Jainas. Unlike their Brahmanical and Buddhist counterparts, who 
criticized each other's views virtually without restraint, the Jaina thinkers made a concerted 
effort to reconcile the views of their opponents with their own from an early time onward. 
The result was a [19] philosophical relativism typical of Jainism. The efforts of the Jaina 
philosophers — reconciling conflicting remarks in the early scriptural tradition,11 
attempting to find a place for the ‘partial truths’ of other philosophical schools — seem to 
coincide to a remarkable degree with the activities which exegetes are supposed to carry out 
in the model of Farmer c.s. Here then, if anywhere in the context of classical Indian 
philosophy, one might expect to see the “byproduct” of the model which is the creation of 
high-correlative systems. 
 One doesn't. There is no correlative thought in Jaina philosophy. There are, on the 
other hand, lots of “modes of consideration” (naya). The other schools of Indian philosophy 
do not even have those. Their thinkers present one vision of reality, which they do not feel 
obliged to syncretize with the views of others. It would seem that the classical Indian 
tradition of philosophical thought quite simply does not fit in the model presented by 
Farmer and his co-authors.12 
 
What do we conclude from these observations? The suggestion that correlative thought, or 
even high-correlative systems of thought, develop “as byproducts of exegetical processes 
operating in layered textual traditions over extensive periods” has a certain a priori 
plausibility and exerts a certain a priori attraction. However, intellectual history is not, or 
not exclusively, deduced from theoretical a prioris. This theory may be of help in 
                                                
8 Cf. Garge, 1952. 
9 See Bronkhorst, 2007a. 
10 This would not be the original interpretation of this sentence; see Brereton, 1986. 
11 See Dundas, 1992: 197 f; 2nd ed. p. 229 f., and esp. p. 198 (230): “The catalyst for the emergence of 
philosophical relativism was the condensing by Umåsvåti in the TattvårthasËtra of the often inchoate and 
unconnected remarks found in the early scriptural tradition concerning substance and its modifications and the 
standpoint from which they should be approached into the definitive expression of a distinctively Jain model 
of reality as simultaneously involving the two apparent contradictories of permanence and change.” See 
further Bronkhorst, 2003. 
12 For a recent overview of the main doctrinal positions of the early Indian philosophical schools, see 
Bronkhorst, 2008. 
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understanding certain developments in cultures different from India. In India it does not 
appear to have much to offer. The high-correlative systems of thought which we do find in 
India have not, as far as we can tell, developed in the manner postulated by the theory. And 
the systems of thought (primarily the systems of Indian philosophy) which should, by dint 
of this theory, be high-correlative systems of [20] thought, are not. It seems justified to 
discard the theory as of little use in the Indian context, and to conclude that it does not 
possess the universal characteristics claimed by its authors. 
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